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DECONTEXTUALIZING FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
THE SUPREME COURT'S 1997-98 TERM*
Judith V. Roystert
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law is an extraordinarily complex area of the law. Rooted in
colonialism, it is a sometimes inconsistent welter of treaties, statutes, common law,
constitutional law, and tribal law set against the shifts and turns of federal Indian
policy. It cannot be understood apart from the history of federal-tribal relations.
Indian law is, above all, deeply contextualized. In order to protect the right of self-
government exercised by tribes since time immemorial and guaranteed by the United
States in hundreds of treaties and agreements, cases that challenge tribal governmen-
tal rights and powers' necessitate a meticulous examination of the relevant treaties,
statutes, and judicial precedents in light of federal Indian policy to ensure that tribal
rights are not unduly trenched upon.
This is hard work. It is also work for which the Supreme Court has shown
scant patience in its last term. Increasingly, the Court has shunned the difficult and
detailed analysis that the issues demand and the tribes deserve. Instead, it has begun
taking principles that were previously developed in context, and disengaging them
from that context, generally to the serious disadvantage of the Indian tribes. It treats
contextualized holdings as if they were nothing more than a thin film that can be lifted
from the facts that created them and wrapped around quite different factual contexts
without harm. In the process, the Court is creating an oversimplified Indian law at
the expense of substantial misrepresentation of its own precedents in the area. It is,
in other words, beginning to decontextualize federal Indian law.
As one Ninth Circuit judge recently noted, easy rules have "an appealing
simplicity." But, he added, "federal Indian law does not have a simple history; no
amount of wishing will give it a simple future."3 No amount of wishing will, but the
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioners' Guide to the October1997 Term ofthe United
States Supreme Court, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998.
Professor and Co-Director, Native American Law Program, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Almost all of the Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court in recent years fall into this category.
2. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1993) (Beezer, J., dissenting), cert.
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Supreme Court just might. If any theme runs through the five Indian law cases of the
1997-1998 term, it is the Court's tendency to a distorting simplification of complex
and demanding issues.
II. THE TAX CASES
Two of the five cases decided last term involved issues of state taxation in
Indian country. In both decisions, the Court decontextualized its precedents in the
area, expanding the reach of state taxing power in Indian country beyond what its
prior case law would support.
A. State Taxation of Indian-Owned Lands
The prime example of the Court's decontextualization of Indian law is the case
of Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.4 Although there are few
definitive rules in federal Indian law, the Court has held for 120 years that a state tax
is invalid if the legal incidence of the tax falls on a tribe or its members within Indian
country, unless Congress has clearly authorized the state taxation.5 In 1993, Cass
County, Minnesota, began to assess ad valorem property taxes on lands within the
Leech Lake Reservation that were owned in fee by the Band. The Leech Lake Band
paid the taxes under protest, and sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that
Congress had not consented to the state taxes on tribally-owned lands within Indian
country.
Cass County began assessing its tax one year after the Court's 1992 decision
in County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation,6 which authorized state taxation of
lands owned in fee by tribal members pursuant to the General Allotment Act (GAA)
of 1887. The GAA was the cornerstone of federal Indian policy from the mid- 1 880s
until 1934, and represented a fundamental shift in the federal approach to Indian
affairs.8 Rather than continue the long-standing policy of a "measured separatism"
between Indian tribes and white citizens,9 the federal government embarked on an
effort to break down tribes and assimilate Indians into the dominant society. Central
to that policy was the GAA's program of allotting communal tribal trust lands to
individual Indians and opening the "surplus" reservation lands to white settlement. 10
4. 118S.Ct. 1904(1998).
5. See, e.g.,OklahomaTax Comm'n v. ChickasawNation,515 U.S. 450 (1995); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac
and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); In re New
York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866); In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
6. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). For a more complete critique of the decision, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARE. ST. LJ. 1, 20-29 (1995).
7. General Allotment Act, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (1994)).
8. See generally JANEr A. MCDoNNa.L, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934 (1991);
FREDERICK E. HoxiE, A FINAL PRonisE: THE CAMPAIGNTO ASSIMILATETHE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984).
9. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 16 (1987).
10. See generally Royster, supra note 6, at 7-14.
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Two sections of the GAA were crucial to the Court's decision in County of
Yakima. Section 5 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue a trust patent to
Indian allottees, under which the land would be held by the United States in trust for
the allottee for twenty-five years. " After the trust period, the allottee would receive
a patent in fee, at which time the allotted land would become freely alienable and
subject to encumbrance. Section 6 contained a proviso added by the Burke Act of
1906.12 The section authorized the Secretary to issue a fee patent prior to the
expiration of the twenty-five year trust period if the Secretary determined that the
allottee was competent to manage his or her affairs.' 3 If one of these "premature
patents" was issued, the allotment was expressly free from "all restrictions as to sale,
incumbrance, or taxation of said land."' 4
In County of Yakima, the Court determined whether Yakima County,
Washington, could tax former allotments now owned in fee by members of the
Yakama Nation within the boundaries of the Yakama Reservation. 5 The lands at
issue had been patented in fee pursuant to section 5 of the GAA, and the Court
reiterated the standard that state taxation of Indian lands is prohibited unless
Congress has given "unmistakably clear" consent.' 6 Then, although section 5
authorized only alienation and encumbrance of fee-patented land, and although the
Burke Act proviso of section 6 authorized taxation only of prematurely patented land,
the Court held that section 5 lands were also subject to taxation once a fee patent had
issued. 7 The section 6 proviso, the Court stated, merely "reaffirmed for such
'prematurely' patented land what section 5 of the General Allotment Act implied with
respect to patented land generally: subjection to state real estate taxes."' 8
The Court's decision in County of Yakima also relied in part on the 1906 case
of Goudy v. Meath."' In Goudy, the Court held that land owned in fee by a member
of the Puyallup Tribe, which had been allotted and patented pursuant to a treaty of
1854, was subject to state property taxes.20 The Court claimed that "it would seem
strange' for Congress to authorize the alienation of Indian lands while retaining an
immunity from state taxation.2' Moreover, the Court noted, the GAA had made the
allottees citizens of the United States, and citizens were subject to the laws of the
states, including the tax laws.22 For this proposition, the Court relied on its 1905
decision in In re Heff, which determined that the language in the GAA that allottees
were "subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which
11. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1994)).
12. General Allotment Act, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (1887), amended by Burke Act, ch. 2348,34 Stat. 182 (1906)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §349 (1994)).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 253. In 1994, the Yakama Indian Nation changed the spelling of its name
from "Yakima." See Yakamas Alter Spelling of Tribe, SEATrt TIMSs, Jan. 26, 1994, at B2.
16. County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 258 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)).
17. See id. at 264,270.
18. Id. at 264.
19. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
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they may reside,"23 subjected allottees to full state jurisdiction upon the issuance of
a trust patent.24 In re Heff, however, was overturned by the Burke Act proviso of
1906, which provided that state jurisdiction would apply only when a fee patent was
issued.25 Moreover, the Court itself overruled In re Heff ten years later in United
States v. Nice,26 holding that when a fee patent issued, allottees were not subject to
all state laws, but only to those consistent with acts of Congress and the federal-tribal
relationship.27 In light of Nice, therefore, the decision in Goudy begs the question: the
Court did not engage in a close analysis of the Puyallup treaty of 1854 to determine
whether state taxation was consistent with that document, but merely assumed that,
because the allottee had been made a citizen, state taxation was permissible absent
a "clearly manifested" exemption.' Similarly, in County of Yakima, the Court
merely reiterated Goudy's "it would seem strange" language,29 without noting that
Goudy's reasoning had been substantially undercut by the Court's subsequent
decision in Nice.
Although the Court's reasoning in County of Yakima was based in part on
Goudy, the decision primarily rested on a detailed examination of the General
Allotment Act to discern Congress's intent to permit state taxation of former
allotments. In Leech Lake, however, the Court engaged in no equivalent analysis of
the statute under which the lands of the Leech Lake Reservation passed into fee
status.
The Leech Lake Reservation had originally been held in trust for the Band
pursuant to its treaties with the United States. In 1889, Congress enacted the Nelson
Act to implement the allotment and assimilation policy for the Chippewa Tribes of
Minnesota.3" The Nelson Act called for the Minnesota Chippewa generally to cede
and relinquish their title to land in the state. Following the cession, the United States
would dispose of the lands in one of three ways: first, lands would be allotted to tribal
members as provided for in the GAA; second, pine lands would be sold at auction to
the highest bidder; and third, the remaining surplus or "agricultural lands" would be
sold to non-Indians under the Homestead Act of 1862.
31
Congress repudiated the allotment policy in 1934 with passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).32 Although the IRA did not repeal either the GAA or the
Nelson Act, it ended any further allotment of lands. 33 In addition, it extended the trust
23. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488,502-03 (1905).
24. See Goudy, 203 U.S. at 149.
25. See Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §349 (1994)).
26. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
27. See id. at 600-01 (1916). The Court stated: "That [the words of the GAA] were to be taken with some implied
limitations, and not literally, is obvious." Id. at 600; see also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,479 (1976).
28. Goudy, 203 U.S. at 149.
29. County ofYakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,263 (1992).
30. Nelson Act, ch. 24,25 Stat. 642 (1889).
31. See id.
32. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-463 (1994)).
33. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994).
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period for all allotments not yet in fee status until Congress provided otherwise,34 and
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to restore unallotted surplus lands and acquire
new lands for the tribes.3" Because of the effects of the Nelson Act, however, by
1977 less than five percent of the Leech Lake Reservation was held in trust for the
Band or its members.
36
In the last two decades, the Band embarked on a program of repurchasing fee
land within its reservation.37 Under this program, the Band acquired 21 parcels of
land in fee: thirteen had originally been allotted to members of the tribe; seven had
been sold to non-Indians as pine lands; and one had been acquired by a non-Indian
under the Homestead Act.38 Cass County assessed ad valorem property taxes against
the 21 parcels, 39 and the Band sought a declaratory judgment in federal district
court.4 °
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit determined that the state could tax
the thirteen parcels that had been allotted under the Nelson Act, which stipulated that
allotments would be made as provided in the GAA.4' As to the remaining parcels of
pine lands and homestead lands, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that state taxation was permissible. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari only as to the pine and homestead lands.42
In determining whether those lands were subject to ad valorem property taxes,
however, the Court engaged in no analysis whatsoever of congressional intent to
permit state taxation in the Nelson Act. In fact, the Nelson Act became all but
irrelevant to the question. Despite its clear reliance on the language of the GAA in
County of Yakima, the Court in Leech Lake asserted that its previous decision had
nothing to do with the particulars of the GAA. Instead, the Court stated, County of
Yakima, along with Goudy v. Meath, "stands for the proposition that when Congress
makes reservation lands freely alienable, it is 'unmistakably clear' that Congress
intends that land to be taxable by state and local governments, unless a contrary
intent is 'clearly manifested." Because the pine lands and homesteaded lands of the
Leech Lake Reservation were freely alienable under the Nelson Act, they were also
34. See id. § 462.
35. See id. §§ 463,465.
36. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1998).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1908.
39. In 1995, the Band successfully petitioned the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to § 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C.
§ 465 (1994), to take eleven of the parcels in trust for the tribe, including seven of the eight parcels at issue before the
Court. See Leech Lake, 118 S. Ct. at 1908 n.1, 1910. Lands held in trust are not subject to state taxation. See 25
U.S.C. § 465 (1994).
40. See Leech Lake, 118 S. Ct at 1908.
41. See id. (The Eighth Circuit conditioned its approval of state taxation of these parcels on the district court's
finding on remand that the lands had been patented after the Burke Act proviso of 1906.); Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 108 F.3d 820, 827, 829-30 (8th Cir. 1997). In light of the Court's disposition of
the case, however, that finding would be irrelevant.
42. The Band cross-petitioned with respect to the thirteen former allotments, but the Court denied review. See
Leech Lake, 118 S. Ct. at 1908 n.2.
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taxable by the county.4'
It may be that the Nelson Act manifests an unmistakably clear congressional
intent to permit state taxation of fee lands originally acquired as pine lands or
agricultural lands. The Court found, however, that an examination of the statute was
unnecessary to make that determination, so long as the statute authorized the
alienability of reservation lands.45 In so doing, the Court lifted a "rule" out of the
particularized context of the General Allotment Act, and plunked it down in an
entirely different set of circumstances, without bothering to analyze whether it fit.4
6
But given the long-standing tribal immunity from state taxation, and the crucial
values of self-government that immunity is designed to help protect, Indian tribes
deserve better from the Supreme Court. At the very least, the Court should not use
a statute to strip tribes of their historical right to be free of state taxes without close
analysis of the statute itself to determine whether that was the outcome that Congress
intended.
B. State Taxation of Non-Indian Mining Companies
The second tax case decided last term was the latest incarnation of a twenty-
year-old dispute between the Crow Tribe and the State of Montana over severance
taxes assessed against coal mined from the Crow "ceded strip."'47 In Montana v.
Crow Tribe of Indians,4 the Tribe sought disgorgement of taxes that the state had
improperly assessed against a non-Indian lessee of the ceded strip. The Court denied
the Tribe's claim, and in the process decontextualized the holding of one of its most
important cases on state taxation in Indian country, Cotton Petroleum Corporation
v. New Mexico.
49
The Crow Tribe case began in 1972 when Westmoreland Resources, a non-
Indian company, leased 31,000 acres of the Crow ceded strip for coal mining
pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) of 1938.50 In 1975, Montana
assessed a severance tax of 30% and a gross proceeds tax of approximately 5% of
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1911.
46. The Leech Lake case is not the first time that Justice Thomas, author of the opinion, has taken a doctrine
developed in the context of allotment and used it to the detriment of tribes in an unrelated context. Based on the
purposes ofthe allotment policy, the Courtdetermined in 1981 that Indian tribes generally do not have civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers on fee lands that resulted from the allotment process unless the tribes can show consent or direct
effects on core tribal govemmental interests. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). In his first Indian law opinion, Justice Thomas applied that approach to tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers on lands that were taken for a flood control project, stating that the purpose for which
the lands were taken from tribal ownership was irrelevant. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 1 13 S. Ct. 2309,2316,2318
(1993).
47. The Crow ceded strip is an area ofapproximately 1,137,000 acres, originally within the boundaries ofthe Crow
Reservation, that the Crow Tribe ceded to the United States in 1904. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352.
Although the United States opened the surface lands to non-Indians, it retained the mineral rights in trust for the Tribe.
48. 118 S. Ct. 1650 (1998) [hereinafter Crow Tribe].
49. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
50. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1994).
[Vol. 34.329
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the contract sale price of all coal produced in the state." Westmoreland paid the
taxes without protest.5 2 In 1976, the Crow Tribe adopted a tax code that imposed a
25% severance tax on all coal mining on Crow lands. 3 Although the tax applied to
the ceded strip as well as to the Crow Reservation proper, the Secretary of the
Interior disapproved the tax as it applied to the ceded strip because of a limitation in
the Tribe's constitution. 4
In 1978, the Crow Tribe brought suit in federal court for declaratory and
injunctive relief against Montana's assessment of its taxes on coal belonging to the
Tribe. After the Ninth Circuit determined that the Tribe's allegations, if proven,
would entitle it to a ruling that Montana's taxes were preempted,55 the federal district
court agreed to deposit Westmoreland's severance tax and gross proceeds payments
into the court's registry pending the outcome of the Tribe's case against Montana.56
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the state's taxes on ceded strip coal were
both preempted by federal law as reflected in the IMLA and barred for infringing on
tribal rights of self-government; the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. In
1988, the district court ordered distribution of the tax monies in the registry to the
United States as trustee for the Tribe.5 The Tribe then sought disgorgement of the
taxes collected by Montana before the registry was established.5 9
The Court held that the Crow Tribe was not entitled to disgorgement of the pre-
registry taxes."° First, it determined that the pre-registry taxes should not have been
paid to the Tribe because the Tribe itself could not have taxed Westmoreland without
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.6 Moreover, the Court found that
Montana's taxes did not deprive the tribe of its fair share of the value of the coal
because the Tribe could not have taxed production on the ceded strip during the pre-
registry years and there was no evidence that Westmoreland would have paid a higher
royalty in the absence of the state taxes.62 There was, in other words, no evidence
that Westmoreland had paid taxes to the wrong sovereign, or that the state taxes it
paid had any substantial economic effect on the Tribe.
As a foundation for both aspects of its decision, the Court relied upon a
51. See Mor.CoEANN. §§15-23-701 to 704, 15-35-101 to 111 (1979).
52. See Crow Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1654.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1654-55. The Secretary had review power over tribal laws pursuant to the Tribe's constitution.
55. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), as amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter Crow 1].
56. See Crow Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1655. The court granted ajoint motion by the Tribe and Westmoreland as to the
severance tax in January 1983, and as to the gross proceeds tax in November 1987. See id.
57. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895,903 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Crow I], affd mem., 484 U.S.
997 (1988).
58. See Crow Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1656.
59. At some point, Westmoreland agreed, in exchange for $50,000, to dismiss with prejudice any claim it might
have to refund of the taxes paid to the state. See id. at 1654.
60. See id. at 1661.
61. See id. The Secretary approved the taxes on ceded strip coal in 1982. See id. That same year, prior to their
joint motion to deposit tax monies in the registry, the Tribe and Westmoreland amended their lease, with secretarial
approval, under which the company agreed to pay the Tribe a tax equal to the state's then-existing taxes, less any
payments Westmoreland was required to make to the state. See id. at 1655.
62. See id. at 1661.
1999]
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decontextualized reading of its 1989 opinion in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v.
New Mexico.63 In Cotton Petroleum, the Court held that New Mexico's severance
tax levied on non-Indian companies extracting oil and gas on Jicarilla Apache tribal
lands was not preempted by principles of federal Indian law.6 4 Because the Court had
previously found that tribes retain the sovereign right to tax,65 including specifically
the right of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe to impose an oil and gas severance tax on its
lessees, 66 Cotton Petroleum approved concurrent Jicarilla and New Mexico
taxation.
67
In holding that the state severance tax was not preempted, the Court in Cotton
Petroleum recognized an analytical framework from its prior Indian law preemption
decisions.6 8 In those cases, the Court appeared to design a three-factor approach to
the preemption of state taxes on non-Indians doing business in Indian country:
whether the federal government had enacted a comprehensive statutory and regulatory
scheme governing the activity being taxed; whether the economic burden of the state
tax fell on the tribe and imposed substantial negative effects; and whether the state
provided benefits and services that would justify the tax.69
The Court then determined that none of the factors was present in the case of
New Mexico's severance tax on the Jicarilla lessees, relying on findings made by the
district court. First, federal control over oil and gas production on the Jicarilla
Reservation was not exclusive because the state regulated the spacing and mechanical
integrity of the wells.70 Second, the state taxes placed no economic burden on the
Tribe, and the tribe could have increased its own tax rate without adverse effects on
oil and gas development.7 ' On that basis, the Court distinguished its summary
affirmance that Montana's extremely high severance taxes on coal mined from the
Crow ceded strip were preempted. 72 And third, the state provided on-reservation
services to Cotton Petroleum and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe."
The Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum that New Mexico could concurrently
tax oil and gas on Jicarilla Apache lands was thus based on the particular facts of
that case: not only the economic situation, but New Mexico's regulation of aspects
63, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
64. See id. at 184-86. The Court also held that the tax was not preempted by the IMLA. See id. at 177-83.
65. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,152 (1980); Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
66. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 158 (1982).
67. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192-93.
68. See id. at 183-84. The Court relied upon White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brackert, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), and
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
69. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184-86.
70. See id. at 186. At no time did the Court explain why New Mexico had the authority to regulate on tribal lands.
States generally have no authority to do so absent congressional consent. In fact, the Ninth Circuit found, in a case
challenging the Department of the Interior's delegation of authority to the State of Montana over the location and
spacing ofoil and gas wells on Indian lands, thatstates have a"clearlack ofjurisdiction overtribal leases." Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes v. Board ofOil and Gas, 792 F.2d 782,796 (9th Cir. 1986). Interior Department regulations permit
the Secretary to adopt or make applicable state law on a case by case basis if it is"in the best interest" of the tribe, 25
C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (1998), but there was no indication in Cotton Petroleum that this was the case.
71. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185.
72. See id. at 186n.17 (referencing Crowll, 484 U.S.997 (1988), summarily affg 819 F.2d 895(9th Cir. 1987)).
73. See id. at 185.
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of the oil and gas production. In Crow Tribe, however, the Court decontextualized
its prior decision, creating out of the fact-specific Cotton Petroleum case a principle
that "neither the State nor the Tribe enjoys authority to tax to the total exclusion of
the other."74 Entirely ignoring the fact that the federal scheme governing coal mining
on the Crow ceded strip is exclusive and that Montana therefore regulates no aspect
of the coal mining, the Court focused solely on the economic impact prong. In the
case of the Crow ceded strip, the Court concluded, "under our Cotton Petroleum
decision, Montana could have imposed a severance tax, albeit not one so extraordi-
narily high."7
5
In Crow Tribe, then, the Court appears to have created a simple rule that all
states may tax all non-Indian lessees of tribal mineral resources, up to the point of
substantial economic burdens on the tribe, regardless of an exclusive federal scheme
governing mineral leases and regardless of the lack of state regulation of mineral
production on tribal lands. But that oversimplified approach is contrary to the
Court's long-standing test for preemption of state law: that a comprehensive federal
statutory and regulatory scheme leaves no room for additional state burdens.
76
Moreover, concurrent taxation inevitably makes tribal mineral resources less
attractive to non-Indian developers.77 Those mineral resources belong to the tribes
as sovereign governments, not to the states, and tribes should therefore be able to
capture the full economic benefits of mineral production. Under the Court's
decontextualized reading of Cotton Petroleum, however, tribal control over tribal
mineral resources is compromised in favor of concurrent state taxation.
III. THE INDIAN COUNTRY CASES
Two of the Court's 1997-1998 Indian law cases involved questions of the
existence of Indian country. "Indian country" is a term of art in federal Indian law,
defined by statute as including three categories of lands: first, "all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation" regardless of ownership; second, "all dependent
Indian communities;" and third, "all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished. 78 Indian country defines the outer boundaries of a tribe's
74. Crow Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1661; see also id. at 1662 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(agreeing with the Court's reading of Cotton Petroleum).
75. Id. at 1661.
76. See, e.g., White Mountain ApacheTribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
77. In the Indian Energy Resources Act of 1992, Congress established an Indian Energy Resource Commission and
charged it (among other things) with developing recommendations concerning dual tribal-state mineral taxation. 25
U.S.C. § 3505(k)(1) (1994). The Commission's mandate stems directly from the belief of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs that Cotton Petroleum created a "disincentive" for oil and gas production on Indian lands.
"The Committee strongly questions the Court's reasoning and views the allowance of this state severance tax as
potentially contrary to the fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty andthe Congressional policy to create economic
development on reservations." H.R.REP. No. 474 pt. 8, at 93,95-96 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2282.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Although this definition is contained in the federal criminal code, the Supreme Court
has clarified that it applies to issues of civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government, 118 S. Ct. 948,952 (1998); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975).;
see also, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540-41 (10th Cir. 1995); Mustang
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territorial jurisdiction, and thus is crucial to the assertion of tribal governmental rights
and powers.
A. Reservation Diminishment
One of the Indian country issues decided by the Court was the question of
reservation diminishment or disestablishment. The diminishment cases focus on the
surplus lands program of the allotment and assimilation years of federal Indian
policy. Under the General Allotment Act, once a reservation was allotted to tribal
members, the "surplus" lands, often millions of acres, could be opened to white
settlement.79 The fundamental question in the disestablishment cases is whether
Congress, when it opened the surplus lands of reservations, intended to remove the
lands from reservation status and leave only a diminished reservation intact.80
In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,8I the Court held that the surplus lands
act opening the Yankton Sioux Reservation diminished the opened lands from the
reservation.8" The case arose when the Tribe objected on environmental grounds to
a multi-county landfill on fee lands within the Yankton Sioux Reservation. The
landfill site was located on lands that had been taken under the Yankton Sioux
surplus lands act of 1894,83 and the question for the Court was whether the surplus
lands had been diminished from the reservation.
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has decided a half dozen
diminishment cases.84 In the early cases, the Court distinguished between surplus
lands acts that terminated the lands from the reservation, and those that merely made
the surplus lands within the reservation available to those who wished to settle them.
In particular, it declared "an almost insurmountable presumption" of diminishment
in cases where the surplus lands act had two characteristics.8 ' First, Congress must
have used language expressly terminating the reservation.86 Initially, the Court
focused on unambiguous language: for example, that the lands were "vacated and
restored to the public domain '' 87 or that the reservation was "discontinued" or
"abolished."88  More recently, however, the Court has not demanded express
Production Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117S, Ct. 1288 (1997).
79. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388,389-90(1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
381 (1994). Congress implemented the allotment program on 118 Indian reservations, and opened the surplus lands
on 44 ofthose. See 1 AMmERCANINDIANPotUcyREviEBWCo mMSSON, FINALREPORT309 (1977). In total, Indian tribes
lost some 60 million acres of land under the surplus lands program. See FEux S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 138 (Rennard Strickland, ed. 1982).
80. See generally Royster, supra note 6, at 29-43.
81. 118 S. Ct.789 (1998).
82. See id. at 793.
83. Act ofAug. 15, 1894, ch. 290,28 Stat. 286. The act ratified an 1892 agreement between the United States and
the Yankton Sioux. See Yankton Sioux, 118 S. Ct. at 796.
84. See generally Royster, supra note 6, at 29-43.
85. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,470-71 (1984).
86. See id.
87. Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary,368 U.S. 351,354 (1962) (quoting Act of 1892,
ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62, 63).
88. Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481,504 n.22 (1973).
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termination language, instead accepting a provision that the tribe would cede all its
title and rights to the United States.89 The second characteristic necessary to create
a presumption of diminishment was payment of a sum certain for the surplus lands.
90
The Yankton Sioux surplus lands act followed this model. It called for the
Tribe to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right,
title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands" of the reservation, in exchange for
a sum certain of $600,000.91 It thus triggered the Court's strong presumption in
favor of diminishment.
But the Yankton Sioux act also contained a savings clause. Article XVIII
provided that nothing in the agreement "shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of
April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the United States,"
and that "all provisions of the said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be in full force
and effect, the same as though this agreement had not been made, and the said
Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their annuities" promised under the 1858
treaty. 92 The treaty of 1858 created the Yankton Sioux Reservation and established
its exterior boundaries.93
Despite the plain language of the savings clause, the Court held that it applied
only to the annuities guaranteed under the 1858 treaty, and not to the reservation
borders. 94 The Court determined that that was the "most plausible interpretation" of
the savings clause, especially given the Tribe's "evident concern" with the continua-
tion of federally-provided cash, guns, ammunition, food, and clothing.95 The Court
even noted, without comment, that the Tribe's concern arose from the government
negotiator's threat to cut off the annuities and see the Yankton Sioux starve if they
refused to agree to the surplus lands sale.96 In interpreting the savings clause in such
89. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,445 (1975) (tribe would "cede, sell, relinquish, and
convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands." (quoting
Agreement of 1889, Art. 1, 26 Stat. 1036 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4578 (1994))); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584,597 (1977) (tribe would "cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all theirclaim,
right, title, and interest in and to" the surplus lands (quoting Act of 1904, ch. 1485, 33 Stat. 256)).
90. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71. By contrast, no such presumption arises if Congress opened reservation lands
to homesteading, and deposited the proceeds ofthe sales in the Treasury for the benefit ofthe tribe. SeeMattz,412U.S.
at 496-97.
91. Yankton Sioux, I ISS. Ct. at 795 n. 1 (quoting Articles I-II of the 1892 agreement (ratified as Act ofAug. 15,
1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286,311)).
92. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290,28 Stat. 286,318 (quoted in Yankton Sioux, 118 S. Ct. at 795 n.1.)
93. Treaty of Apr. 19, 1858, Art. I, 11 Stat. 743, 744.
94. See Yankton Sioux, 118 S. Ct. at 800. Fora fuller analysis and critique of the Court's decision, see Judith V.
Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case ofthe Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998); AJ.
Taylor, Note, A Lack of Trust: South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe and the Abandonment of the Trust Doctrine
in Reservation Diminishment Cases, 73 WASH. L. REv. 1163 (1998).
95. Yankton Sioux at 799-800.
96. Seeid. The government negotiator told the Yankton Sioux, atone "particularly tense point in the negotiations"
when it appeared that the Tribe might refuse to cede title to its lands:
I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the Great Father to-day for a
living. Let the Government send out instructions to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let
the Government instruct your agent to cease to issue yourclothes .... Let the Government instruct
him to cease to issue your supplies, let him take away the money to run your schools with, and I
want to know what you would do. Everything you are wearing and eating is gratuity. Take all
this away and throw this people wholly upon their own responsibility to take care of themselves,
and what would be the result! Not one-fourth of your people could live through the winter, and
when the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust of all the balance of your noble tribe.
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a restrictive manner, of course, the Court gave effect only to one phrase of Article
XVIII. It ignored most of the language of the clause as preserving rights "plainly
inconsistent" with the remainder of the surplus lands act.97 Nothing, however, is
inconsistent between the Tribe's ceding title to certain reservation lands while still
bargaining to preserve intact the reservation itself, the territory over which the Tribe
exercised it sovereignty.
The Yankton Sioux decision is thus an example of the decontextualization of
Indian law. The Court took an arguably reasonable rule from its prior cases-an
"almost insurmountable presumption" of diminishment if the tribe ceded the surplus
lands for a sum certain-and applied it despite a savings clause that explicitly
preserved "all provisions" of the 1858 treaty which established the reservation
boundaries. If that safeguarding of the reservation borders is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption, then the Court has in effect created an irrebuttable
presumption of diminishment which it will apply regardless of context.
B. Alaska Native Villages
In the second Indian country decision of the past term, the Court determined
whether Alaska Native village lands are Indian country. In Alaska v. Native Village
of Venetie Tribal Government,98 the Court held that lands set aside for Alaska Native
villages under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) are not dependent
Indian communities, 9 and therefore are not Indian country.'"
The Neets'aii Gwich'in of the Native Village of Venetie adopted a constitution
in 1940 pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.01 In 1943, the Secretary
of the Interiorset aside a reservation surrounding the village, and the Neets'aii
Gwich'in governed that reservation pursuant to its constitution. In 1971, Congress
enacted ANCSA, designed to settle all Alaska Native land claims.0 2 The statute
revoked all reservations that had been created in Alaska, 3 extinguished all aboriginal
claims to land in the state, and reconveyed to the Alaska Natives $962.5 million and
approximately 44 million acres of land.'" The lands and funds, however, were
transferred to state-chartered corporations formed pursuant to ANCSA, whose
shareholders were required to be Alaska Natives.'0 5 Two village corporations were
Id. (quoting Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 10, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 74).
97. Id. at 800.
98. 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994).
100. See Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at951(1998).
101. See Alaska exrel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native VillageofVenetieTribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286,1289 (9th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
102. Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, ch. 38, 85 Stat. 668 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629(e)
(1994)).
103. One reservation survived ANCSA: the Annette Island Reserve of the Metlakatla Indians. See 18 U.S.C. §
1618(a) (1994).
104. See id. §§ 1603, 1605.
105. See id. § 1607.
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established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in, including Venetie, and in 1973 those
corporations opted under ANCSA to take title in fee to the former reservation lands
in exchange for forgoing the land and money transfers.
3 6
In 1986, the Tribe assessed its business activities tax on a private contractor
who was building a public school in Venetie with state funds, pursuant to a joint
venture with the State of Alaska. The state subsequently filed suit in federal district
court to enjoin Venetie's collection of the tax.0 7 The district court held that Venetie
could not impose the tax because its lands were not Indian country, and the Ninth
Circuit reversed.'
The Court first noted that the issue was whether Venetie's lands constituted a
dependent Indian community under the Indian country statute. °9 When Congress
codified the definition of Indian country in 1948, it adopted the phrase "dependent
Indian community" from the Court's decision in United States v. Sandoval, 0 which
held that Pueblo lands were Indian country. Even though the Pueblos owned their
lands in fee, the Sandoval Court explained that the title was communal rather than
individual, and thus that the Pueblo lands were like the fee lands of the Five Tribes
in eastern Oklahoma: subject to federal superintendence in the exercise of the
government's fiduciary obligations to the Indian tribes.' Moreover, as the Court
observed in Venetie, Congress had recognized Pueblo title by statute and the
President had set aside additional lands for their "use and occupancy."'"12 Conse-
quently, despite the lack of trust status or other restrictions on alienation, the Pueblo
lands were Indian country.
Subsequently, in United States v. Pelican, the Court formulated a general
description of Indian country as lands which "had been validly set apart for the use
of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government." ' 3 In Venetie,
the Court explained that because Congress had codified case law in the Indian
country statute, Congress intended to incorporate the Pelican Court's two-part test
of federal set-aside and federal superintendence into the statutory definition. Thus,
lands constitute a dependent Indian community if they have been set aside for the use
of Indians under federal superintendence. 114
Prior to Venetie, the Court had employed the statutory definition of Indian
country and its common law antecedent in a highly contextualized manner. In
particular in its cases concerning the first statutory definition of Indian coun-
106. See Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 951; 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b) (1994).
107. See Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at949.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 953. ANCSA revoked the formal reservation status of the Venetie lands, and no allotments were
involved.
110. 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
111. See id. at 48.
112. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 953 (citing Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39).
113. 232 U.S. 442,449 (1914). Pelican held that trust allotments which were createdo utofa diminished reservation
continued to be Indian country. The holding was subsequently codified as the third definition of Indian country. See
18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1994).
114. See Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 954; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
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try-Indian reservations-the Court has consistently looked beyond the formalistic
statutory category.
Prior to the codification of the Indian country definition, the Court held in
United States v. McGowan that the Reno Indian Colony was Indian country.' 15
Although the Colony was not a formal reservation, the federal government had
purchased the land for the Indians and taken the land into trust, exercising the
authority to enact laws and regulations for the Colony. ' 6 Similarly, forty years later
in United States v. John, the Court determined that lands of the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw were Indian country." 7 In the early decades of this century, lands were
purchased with federal funds for the Mississippi Choctaw, and in 1939 Congress took
those lands into trust status. "8 The Court declared that "[t]here is no apparent reason
why these lands ... did not become a 'reservation"' when they were taken into
trust." 9 Any doubt about the status, the Court noted, was removed in 1944 when the
Secretary of the Interior formally proclaimed the lands a reservation. 2"
More recently, in two cases concerning tribal trust lands in Oklahoma, the Court
again determined that such lands would be considered reservations. In Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Court,
relying on its decision in John, noted that none of its precedents "has ever drawn the
distinction between tribal trust land and reservations that Oklahoma urges."'' Two
years later, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, the Court plainly
held that tribal trust lands constitute "informal" reservations within the meaning of
the statutory definition. 22
The "reservation" cases under the Indian country definition, in other words, rely
not on formalistic categories, but on the context of the particular lands at issue.
When the Court took up the issue of dependent Indian communities in Venetie,
however, its approach changed radically. Although it nominally relied upon the two-
part common law test, in fact it created a decontextualized reading that essentially
nullifies the dependent Indian communities definition for tribes other than the Pueblos
and the tribes of eastern Oklahoma.
Applying its common law test to the ANCSA lands of the Neets'aii Gwich'in,
the Court concluded that neither the federal set-aside prong nor the federal
superintendence prong was met. First, the Court held that there was no federal set-
aside of the lands because the reservations were revoked, and lands were transferred
to state-chartered Native corporations with no restrictions on alienation. The Alaska
Natives could freely alienate the land to non-Indians and use it "for non-Indian
115. 302 U.S. 535,536 (1938).
116. See id. at 538-39.
117. 437 U.S. 634,647-48 (1978).
118. See id. at 646 (citing ch. 235, 53 Stat. 851 (1939)).
119. Id. at 649.
120. Id. The proclamation appears at 9 Fed. Reg. 14907 (1944).
121. 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991). See also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1938) ("it is
immaterial whether Congress designates a settlement as a 'reservation' or 'colony."').
122. 508 U.S. 114, 123, 128 (1993).
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purposes."' 23
The Court contrasted this situation to cases such as McGowan, where the lands
had been taken into trust for the Indians. 24 In doing so, the Court seems to indicate
that the federal set-aside requirement can be met only if the lands are in trust status.
But the clear import of the Court's reservation cases is that if land is taken into trust
for a tribe, it qualifies as a reservation, even if an "informal" one. As a result, tribal
trust lands are already accounted for under the first statutory definition. If the
dependent Indian communities definition covers only lands that would qualify as
reservations in any case, then the dependent Indian communities definition becomes
a nullity.
As to the second prong of the common-law test, that of federal superintendence,
the Court emphasized that it requires federal superintendence with respect to the land
itself, not merely with respect to the tribe." The Court then held that ANCSA
terminated federal superintendence over Alaska Native lands, eliminating any active
federal control or guardianship. 126 Federal control was limited to exemptions from
adverse possession claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments for land that
has not been sold, leased or developed.27 The Court found that these exemptions
"simply do not approach the level of superintendence over the Indians' land that
existed in our prior cases," most of which involved land held in trust.' 28 As with the
federal set-aside prong, the Court appears to all-but require trust status for lands to
be considered a dependent Indian community.
Moreover, the Court noted that Congress's express purpose in enacting ANCSA
was to avoid a "lengthy wardship or trusteeship."'2 9 As the Neets'aii Gwich'in
themselves argued, ANCSA was intended to end federal paternalism and promote
Native self-determination. But the Court believed that this view of ANCSA "severely
undercut" any finding of federal superintendence.' 30 As the Ninth Circuit found,
however, "[t]he federal government is fulfilling, not abandoning, its trust responsibili-
ties when it facilitates Indian self-determination."'' Federal Indian policy for the past
123. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 955. Justice Thomas, author of the opinion, did not explain what he meant by "Indian"
and "non-Indian" purposes for use of Native lands. Unless the Court envisions Indian tribes stuck somewhere in the
nineteenth century, any use that a tribe chooses to make of its lands, including allowing non-Indians to use them, should
be an "Indian" purpose.
124. See id. In Venetie, the Court appeared to view McGowan as a dependent Indian community case. See id. at
954. In John, however, the Court clearly described McGowan as one ofthe cases that Congress relied upon for the first
definition of Indian country: reservations. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634,648 (1978). In McGowan itself,
the Court refused to distinguish between a reservation and a "colony" established at Reno. See United States v.
McGowan, 302 U.S. 535,538-39 (1938).
125. See Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 954 n.5.
126. See id. at 955.
127. See id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1636(d) (1994)).
128. Id. TheCourt cited UnitedStatesv. McGowan,302 U.S. 535(1938) (tribal trust and), United Statesv.Pelican
232 U.S. 442 (1914) (trust allotments), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 37 n. 1 (1913) (Pueblo lands, for
which there was a federal statute placing the lands under the "absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the
United States.").
129. Venetie, 118 S. Ct at956 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994)).
130. Id.
131. Alaska exrel. YukonFlatsSch. Dist. v. Native VillageofVenetieTribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286,1299 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948. (1998).
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quarter-century has been oriented toward the development of tribal self-
government, 32 and tribes should not be forced to choose between their right to self-
determination and their Indian country.
IV. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASE
The Court's fifth case of the 1997-1998 term was the only one of the five
decided in favor of tribal interests. In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., the Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit unless the tribe has waived its immunity or Congress has clearly authorized
lawsuits against the tribe.'33
In Kiowa Tribe, the tribal Industrial Development Commission agreed to buy
certain stock from Manufacturing Technologies. To that end, the tribal Chairman
signed a promissory note on behalf of the Tribe, agreeing to pay $285,000 plus
interest. The note stated that it was signed at the tribal complex, located on tribal
trust lands, but Manufacturing Technologies maintained that the Tribe executed and
delivered the note in Oklahoma City, and the note itself called for payments to be
made in Oklahoma City. Furthermore, the note specified that nothing in it "subjects
or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma."' 34 When the Tribe
defaulted on the note, Manufacturing Technologies brought suit in Oklahoma state
court.
135
The Court held that tribal sovereign immunity from suit, absent tribal waiver
or congressional abrogation, is absolute regardless whether the tribe's activities
occurred within or without Indian country and regardless whether the tribe was acting
in a business or a governmental capacity. 3 6 Although state law may apply to tribal
activities conducted outside Indian country, 1 the Court ruled that that does not mean
that Indian tribes are subject to enforcement actions in state court.' 38 Nothing in its
precedents, the Court noted, had ever drawn any of the distinctions concerning tribal
sovereign immunity that Manufacturing Technologies urged, and the Court refused
to disrupt its well-settled law. 39
Although the Court adhered to a long-standing principle of Indian law, it was
132. See generally Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PuB. PAPERs 564 (1970) (President Nixon);
Statementon Indian Policy, I PUB.PAPERS 96,99 (1983) (President Reagan); Statement Reaffirming the Government.
to-Government Relationship Between theFederal Governmentand Indian Tribal Governments, PuB.PAPERs 662 (199 1)(President Bush); Memorandum ofGovemment-to-Govemment Relations with NativeAmericanTribal Governments,
59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (1994) (President Clinton). See also, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450(a),(b) (1994); Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.




136. See id. at 1702-03. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that tribal
sovereign immunity should not extend to "purely off-reservation conduct." Id. at 1707.
137. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1973).
138. See Kiowa Tribe, 118 S. CL at 1703 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,514 (1991)).
139. See Kiowa Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1703, 1705.
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at pains to highlight the decontextualized nature of the rule and to invite Congress to
change the law."4 First, the Court declared that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity "developed almost by accident."' 41 It had its origins in a passing reference
in Turner v. United States in 1919,42 and subsequently the Court, citing Turner,
solidified it into doctrine in 1940.'43 The Court in Kiowa Tribe admitted that the
doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed,'" but the Court felt compelled to note that
the later cases had "little analysis."'4 Moreover, the Court questioned "the wisdom
of perpetuating the doctrine."'" It declared that today, when tribes participate in the
national economy, the principle of tribal sovereign immunity goes "beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance.' ' 47 Accordingly, the Court called for "a
need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule."'" The Court itself
declined, however, to alter the sovereign immunity doctrine, deferring to Congress,
but at the same time strongly suggesting that Congress exercise its power over Indian
affairs and abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 49
In its disapproval of the doctrine, the Court sympathized with those who could
be harmed by the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine: "those who are unaware that
they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no
choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims."'"5 Although the Kiowa Tribe's
default on its note is certainly not praiseworthy, in the case before the Court, the
sympathy seems misplaced. Manufacturing Technologies could hardly have been
unaware that it was dealing with an Indian tribe; the tribal chairman signed the note
in the name of the Kiowa Tribe. If the company was unaware of tribal sovereign
immunity, it either did not seek, or did not receive, adequate legal advice before
entering into a deal worth more than a quarter million dollars.' 5' An "overarching
rule" abrogating tribal immunity is not necessary to protect business partners who
are, or certainly should be, capable of obtaining proper legal advice and negotiating
a limited waiver of sovereign immunity as a condition of the deal.
The most interesting aspect of the Kiowa Tribe decision, however, is not the
sovereign immunity doctrine that the Court reluctantly adhered to, but the fact that
only in this case did the Court even recognize, much less criticize, its
140. The Court spent four paragraphs deciding the case, four paragraphs explaining what was wrong with the rule
it felt bound by, and five paragraphs inviting Congress to intervene. Id. at 1702-05.
141. Id. at 1703. Tribal sovereign immunity may have developed in that manner, but the Court failed to recognize
that all sovereigns, tribes included, enjoy common law immunity from suit absent waiver or abrogation.
142. 248 U.S. 354, 357-58 (1919).
143. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 309 U.S. 506,512 (1940).
144. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,58 (1978); Three Affiliated Tribes ofFort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S.
877, 890 (1986); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510
(1991); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S. Ct. 2028,2033-34(1997).
145. Kiowa Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 1704.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1705.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1704.
151. See id. at 1702. As the Court stated, the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine was well-established and long-
standing. See id. at 1704.
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decontextualization of Indian law. The Court specifically reproached its prior
decisions for the lack of analytical rigor that created a simplified doctrine without
regard to context. It bemoaned the necessity of following a rule that it perceived to
be divorced from modem economic realities. Yet in its other four decisions of the
1997-1998 term, the Court created precisely the sort of decontextualized doctrines
that it found so distasteful in Kiowa Tribe. If the "appealing simplicity" of an easy
rule "'52 is a bad thing when it may disadvantage non-Indian businesses, surely it is a
worse thing when it strips tribes of their territories and subjects their lands and
economies to state taxation. But no justice protested the distorting simplification of
doctrine in the latter group of cases. The Court's lack of concern with
decontextualization in the four decisions adverse to Indian tribes is all the more
marked by contrast to its censure of the practice in Kiowa Tribe.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's 1997-1998 term decisions all, to a greater or lesser extent, simplify
some aspect of the complex field of federal Indian law. In four of the five decisions,
the Court lifted highly contextualized principles from existing cases, and applied
those rules in different factual contexts, always to the detriment of the Indian tribes.
At no point in those four cases did the Court recognize its distorting oversimplifica-
tions of precedent, or attempt to justify its sacrifice of tribal interests to its apparent
liking for easy solutions. Only in the fifth opinion, decided in favor of the tribal
party, did the Court deplore the idea of simplified doctrine based on minimal analysis.
The Court thus seems intent upon decontextualizing the difficult and demanding
issues of federal Indian law, willingly when those new rules work against the tribes,
and reluctantly only when those rules work in the tribes' favor.
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